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Home and Dwelling 
Re-Examining Race and Identity Through Octavia 
Butler’s Kindred and Paul Beatty’s The Sellout 
Scott Astrada 
 
The question of how to exist, to dwell, within one’s physical and 
psychological home has become an urgent one in an increasingly globalized 
world. Yet the answer to this question has never been more fleeting, yet 
extremely urgent. Lacking universal political or sociological narratives in 
what can be oversimplified as a post-colonial or post-modern milieu, 
reformulating the question of how one dwells within one’s home has 
become both relevant and essential. This essay explores a return to the 
question of how one dwells, not in pursuit of a theoretical harmonizing 
answer, but to reevaluate how the question is generally framed—a return to 
the foundation of how one exists, or more precisely, how a one exists. 
Through Martin Heidegger’s essay on dwelling and Michel Foucault’s 
understanding of history as power, my reading of two works of modern 
fiction captures the struggles of subjects attempting to define their place in 
the world. Examining how the protagonists of Octavia Butler’s Kindred and 
Paul Beatty’s The Sellout dwell within their homes provides much insight 
into how race, identity, and history impact dwelling in a global age. 
 
Heidegger’s Dwelling: The Emergence of a Historical 
Subject 
The starting point of this return is Martin Heidegger’s essay “Building 
Dwelling Thinking.”1 Here, Heidegger is concerned with the concept of 
locations, spaces, and how they serve as a clearing for the emergence of 
Being. These spaces actively shape what occupies them, and influence what 
is connected by the circumference of their core emptiness, thereby creating a 
manifestation of Being that is arbitrary yet full of being. We see this in 
Heidegger’s example of a bridge that crosses a stream: “[i]t does not just 
connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the 
bridge crosses the stream…. It brings stream and bank and land into each 
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other’s neighborhood.”2 It is in this formulation of essence, fundamentally 
informed by locations and spaces, that the individual emerges within 
history. The various structural components of identity (i.e. culture, race, 
gender, geography) come into “each other’s neighborhood,” and from an 
arbitrary confluence of structures emerges a historical subject full to the brim 
of being/essence. Here is where the space creates a clearing that “makes 
room for the fourfold3 in a double sense. The location admits the fourfold, 
and it instills the fourfold. The two—making room in the sense of admitting 
and in the sense of instilling—belong together. As a double space-making, 
the location is a shelter for the fourfold, by the same token, a house”4 This is 
how the space of the subject emerges ostensibly as a singular location, 
deriving an essence from the praxis of self-consciousness, and also as a 
compilation of intersections. Yet these arbitrary structures are infused with 
essence, because the subject breathes life into them and experiences the 
collective as a unit, as a home not as a mere intersectionality of identity. 
However, this location, as the emergence of the subject, is not a homogenous 
and permissive foundation into which culture is simply absorbed. Butler’s 
Kindred and Beatty’s The Sell-out recount how this space of self-consciousness 
is compromised, in one way or another, by the uninvited Other within one’s 
dwelling—a blurring of the line of self and other in the very dwelling space 
of the subject. This is distinct from the act of locating an additional or 
confrontational layer of alienation by an imposed colonial ideology on a 
subject who has been integrated, subjugated, and exists on the periphery of 
their own identities.  
These spaces of identity, which both admit and instill the foundational 
notions of self-consciousness, exist contemporaneously (as a web expanding 
around the social and political) and historically (as the culmination of the 
historical subject). These two axes, the lateral identity (as the locus of the 
intersection of socio-historical systems) and the historical identity (as the 
locus of inherited history on the individual level) are inextricably 
intertwined, working within and upon each other, but creating two distinct 
lived experiences of existence for the subject. The subject as consciousness 
both interprets its place in the world, and is simultaneously defined by it. 
Here we can equate the individual with location per Heidegger, one 
that admits and instills the colonial/Other into being through one’s dwelling 
(identity). As postcolonial notions of race and history gain ground in a 
variety of discourses, there is an evolving recognition of how subjects 
become aware of their own history, both passively and subjectively, as they 
navigate a world moving rapidly toward a globalized history and political 
economy yet still powered by colonial notions of race, power, and politics.  
Thus my reading of Butler’s and Beatty’s novels will examine their 
respective protagonists in terms of their lateral and historical identity (as 
defined above), and how in both texts the subject (or the space of the subject) 
interprets, and is defined by its place of dwelling. 
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Historical Identity & Kindred: History’s Unrelenting Grasp  
The relationship of a subject to their history is the very question of 
Heidegger’s notion of location. How one creates the world is not simply 
how one views it, for how one views the world relies in turn upon historical 
context that determines structures of perception (both physical and 
conceptual). Yet that does not resolve the question. There remains a 
vulnerability of the Other (the ordering of power relationships), a reliance 
upon the other (the subject) to manifest its existence via action in the world. 
Without this action, without this manifestation through the subject and 
within the space of the subject, the Other remains condemned to idealism—
nothing more than a collective dream behind a firewall separate from 
existence. The Other and the other thus engage in a struggle when the 
subject asserts its progression from, or away from, the definitions and 
structures imposed by the Other. Put directly, this is the struggle of a subject 
that rebels against itself (as a manifestation of the Other through itself as a 
historical subject). While it is commonplace to understand the influence of 
the past on the present, Octavia Butler’s Kindred5 conveys the struggle of the 
Other and the other in a manner that captures the complexity of battling 
one’s own history, and poses the question of how one lives moving forward 
in history, when so much of one’s home is determined by the past.  
In Kindred, we can see how the historical space of being, of the 
individual, is not only influential in configuring the subject’s grid of 
perception, but violently captures and molds the very space of perception. 
The protagonist, Dana, journeys back and forth from the present (1970s) 
back in time to the 1800s, experiencing a violent tug-of-war with her white 
slave holder ancestor Rufus, who somehow has the power to summon her 
back in time. During her first trip back in time, Dana saved the young Rufus 
from drowning in a river. She returns shortly after rescuing Rufus when she 
is staring down the barrel of his father’s shotgun as she drags Rufus to the 
riverbank. After this initial journey destabilizes her sense of home, she no 
longer feels safe: “[m]aybe I’m just like a victim of robbery or rape or 
something – a victim who survives, but who doesn’t feel safe anymore.”6 
Here is the first division of her home in both space and time. A divide 
between her present reality as an African-American woman, married to a 
white man, living in a world increasingly gathering behind notions of civil 
rights and equality, and her past, in which she confronts her slave-holding 
ancestor. Dana’s bloodline conflates her past and present in one sweeping 
motion.  
Dana’s journey back in time, beyond the obviously disconcerting 
experience, presages subsequent trips that augment and violently 
reconfigure her sense of home, and more importantly where she considers 
home to be.  After the first experience, and the fear she expresses of not 
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knowing when it might happen again, her home is cast in a state of flux, only 
to be resolved at the end of the book with Rufus’s death.  
What Dana realizes after subsequent trips is that Rufus controls when 
she travels back in time. Whenever Rufus nears death, he unconsciously 
pulls Dana back in time to save his life, whether from a fire, a drowning, a 
vicious fight, or even potential suicide. Dana always travels back to the time 
and place where Rufus needs her to save his life. Dana was at his mercy: 
“[t]he boy [Rufus] drew me to him somehow when he got himself into more 
trouble than he could handle […] He apparently didn’t even know he was 
doing it.”7 The fact that Rufus was unaware of his power, arguably until the 
very end, creates a power dynamic more nuanced than that of 
straightforward master/slave relation.  This becomes especially apparent 
when Dana realizes that Rufus was Dana’s ancestor, and that if something 
were to happen to him, she might cease to exist in her own time: “[w]as that 
why I was here? Not only to insure the survival of one accident-prone small 
boy, but to insure my family’s survival, my own birth.”8 The original 
division of Dana’s home now assumes a tinge of blackmail, a forced 
complicity to keep the Other alive. There is an amalgamation of tyranny, 
exploitation and complicity at the heart of Dana’s identity as she saves Rufus 
again and again. Here is where the Other is at its most powerful in its 
struggle to exist through the other. A subject, in this case Dana, must save 
the Other—Rufus and the slave holding society that enables his position—
not out of agreement or empathy, but of necessity—without the Other I 
might not exist. The tie that binds Dana to Rufus is preclusive, and what 
saves Dana is her fear of death which sends her back to her own time; 
“Rufus’s fear of death calls me to him, and my own fear of death sends me 
home.”9 Here Rufus’s future as an individual relies upon Dana, and Dana is 
ostensibly reliant upon Rufus for her future existence as a historical subject. 
It is only at the end of the novel when Dana kills Rufus because he tries to 
rape her (refusing the Other), that Dana’s future (and past) is free. But her 
freedom comes at a cost. Dana is jettisoned back to her present day after 
killing Rufus, but loses her arm after it is melded into one of the walls of her 
home upon her return. Dana in essence loses part of her body (her arm, one 
of the primary ways one manifests the Other in the world via pen or sword, 
or action) to her home, after expelling the Other from it.   
Yet before the finality of Rufus’s death, Dana experiences 
contradictory feelings for him, similarly to how the slaves of his own time 
viewed him:  
[The other slaves] made gross jokes about him [Rufus] behind his 
back. Strangely, they seemed to like him, hold him in contempt, 
and fear him all at the same time. This confused me because I felt 
just about the same mixture of emotions for him myself…. But then, 
slavery of any kind fostered strange relationships. Only the 
overseer drew simple, unconflicted emotions of hatred and fear 
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when he appeared briefly. But then, it was part of the overseer’s job 
to be hated and feared while the master kept his hands clean.10  
This is the ambiguous origin of the subject, the contradictory nature of Dana 
and Rufus’s relationship: the occupation of contradictory feelings within the 
same space, destined to be together, to interact, but always as separate and 
competing entities that could never absorb the other. And it is this mix of 
tyranny, complicity, and blackmail that drives the conflict. The overseer is 
the role of unambiguous and manifest evil, which allows the master, the 
Other, to seem removed from unambiguous tyranny. However, the overseer 
is never at the heart of the Other. It is the overseer’s role to allow the Other 
to reside in one’s home as the primordial ancestor (here defined as Rufus) 
and as a tyrant—it is this duality that defines the Other. Yet this duality 
exists only from transference of pure tyranny away from the Other and into 
the ‘overseer’ (the role that absorbs uncomplicated hatred), thus allowing 
the Other to appear ambiguous. This ambiguity grows through each of 
Dana’s trips back in time; as Rufus grows older she nurtures and supports 
his journey toward becoming a plantation owner. 
Another central struggle arises between the past and Dana’s white 
husband. When he accidently travels back in time with her, and gets 
stranded there for years, Dana recognizes the danger of the past infringing 
upon the present. Or more precisely, that the norms of the past are not 
simply relics, fossils in a museum that we can gaze upon as markers of 
progress, but lay dormant in our present, and it is the context of the present 
that allows them to manifest or remain latent in the shadows of 
consciousness. More than just his physical safety, Dana worries about 
“another” kind of danger: 
A place like this [the past] would endanger him in a way I didn’t 
want to talk to him about. If he was stranded here for years, some 
part of this place would rub off on him. No large part, I knew, But 
if he survived here, it would be because he managed to tolerate the 
life here. He wouldn’t have to take part in it, but he would have to 
keep quiet about it…. The place, the time would either kill him 
outright, or mark him somehow.11 
Here is the locus of her husband’s struggle with the past infringing upon the 
present, the resistance to complicity. As a white male in a slaveholding 
society, a different dynamic defines his struggle with the Other: the danger 
of complicity by inaction—of passive manifestation. This is a struggle 
between passivity and action, as opposed to Dana who cannot simply 
remain inert—for her there is either invasion or repulsion. Here we see how 
structural positions define the struggle of various subjects in their individual 
revolts against the Other.   
Dana’s sense of home is further divided and compromised when the 
past starts to feel like home. This uncanny sense of dwelling in the past 
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develops as Dana defines herself and her husband as actors, which in turn 
allows them to adjust to their new present: “[t]hat disturbed me too when I 
thought about it. How easily we seemed to acclimatize. Not that I wanted us 
to have trouble, but it seemed as though we should have had a harder time 
adjusting to this particular segment of history—adjusting to our places in the 
household of a slaveholder.”12 She resolves this by concluding that they are 
“actors”:  
I began to realize why Kevin and I had fitted so easily into this 
time. We weren’t really in. We were observers watching a show. 
We were watching history happen around us. And we were actors. 
While we waited to go home, we humored the people around us 
pretending to be like them. But we were poor actors. We never 
really got into our roles. We never forgot we were acting. This was 
something I tried to explain to Kevin on the day the children broke 
through my act. It suddenly became very important that he 
understand.13 
The passage’s conclusion—that that she and her husband were “actors”—as 
the reason they were able to acclimatize to the norms of slave holding 
society is quickly undermined by its last sentence. Dana desperately needs 
to have her husband understand that they are “actors,” almost as if excusing 
her husband’s comfort with her own rationalization. But this illusion is 
shattered when she witnesses the spectacle of slave children ‘playing’ slave, 
as if they were auctioning each other off to frugal buyers. Her husband 
informs her that the children also ‘play’ at field work: “[e]ven the games 
they play are preparing them for their future – and the future will come 
whether they understand it or not.”14 Here is where Dana confronts the social 
objectivity of a manifest history that demolishes self-images and the actors’ 
masks, and it is not in the subject’s control to determine when one can end 
the game, or even whether one is acting or being authentic when 
manifesting the Other. Dana, unlike the other slaves, can escape the game of 
being a slave when she feels her life is threatened; but she sacrifices the 
division between then and now, between the play and the audience, as she 
no longer has a stable subject position—a “here”—from which to participate 
in history. This is the cost of living in a now at odds with the past, of waging 
war with the Other. To wage war with one’s social destiny is to blur the lines 
between the present and the past—to recognize the historical subjectivity of 
one’s now. As a result Dana, without a present, has no basis for action, as she 
realizes: “…I can’t maintain the distance. I am drawn all the way into 
eighteen nineteen, and I don’t know what to do. I ought to be doing 
something though. I know that.”15 Toward the end of the novel, after her 
husband spent years in the past, and she has made numerous trips back in 
time, her home begins to slip away: “[t]he time, the year was right [1970s], 
but the house just wasn’t familiar enough. I felt as though I were losing my 
place here in my own time. Rufus’s time was a sharper, stronger reality.”16 
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Dana also begins to feel the past in the presence of her husband: “[t]he 
expression on his face was like something I’d seen, something I was used to 
seeing on Tom Weylin [Rufus’s father]. Something closed and ugly.”17 Dana 
is experiencing the blurring of the lines between past and present, and the 
disappearance in turn of the singularity and location of her home. 
The consequences of Dana’s safeguarding of Rufus are not lost on her: 
“[s]omeday Rufus would own the plantation. Someday, he would be a 
slaveholder, responsible in his own right for what happened to the people 
who lived in those half-hidden cabins. The boy was literally growing up as I 
watched—growing up because I watched and because I helped to keep him 
safe. I was the worst possible guardian for him—a black to watch over him 
in a society that considered blacks subhuman, a woman to watch over him 
in a society that considered women perennial children.”18 Dana resolves this 
conflict as a battle she is waging on Rufus’s territory, hoping her presence 
and actions will disrupt the Other from fully manifesting through Rufus 
when he grows up, planting ideas in his head to change his future. She 
shares this with her husband who responds that “his environment will be 
influencing him every day you’re gone. And from what I’ve heard, it’s 
common in this time for the master’s children to be on nearly equal terms 
with the slaves. But maturity is supposed to put both in their ‘places’…. Hell 
you’re gambling against history.”19 Dana is battling the Other on its own 
terms, from within her lost home, armed only with dreams of future equality 
and the revelation to Rufus that slavery will be abolished in the future. Yet 
Rufus seems to validate Dana’s husband, when he expresses his 
indifference, or acceptance of the Other, as Rufus has no desire to battle the 
world around him or to challenge it: “[b]ut I read as good as Daddy does 
already. Why should I have to do more than that?”20 And Rufus is 
completely unconcerned with the future, as evidenced by his remarks about 
an abolitionist book (written 100 years after slavery) that Dana shares with 
him: “…why the hell are they still complaining about it?”21 Here lies the 
locus of all three characters’ struggles: the vulnerability of the present to the 
past (and future), and the refusal to risk losing the location of self, by 
venturing into dreams of the future or the grim realities of the past. This 
refusal imprisons Rufus, and ultimately leads to his death.  
After Dana finally kills Rufus, she is not “unborn,” so to speak, but 
permanently scarred from confronting her past and expelling the Other. She 
remains, even after murdering Rufus, but the necessary consequence is that 
she is no longer whole (even if this uniformity was a farce to begin with). Yet 
she as a subject persists, and transcends the Other that used being as the 
ultimate threat to justify its existence. Historical identity at its center is the 
struggle with a subject locked in a battle with its history. Not from the 
external systemic locus of the Other, but as a subject that is the space of the 
Other manifest. 
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Defining Lateral Identity: Space and Location 
The characteristics of Heidegger’s locations can be inscribed within various 
social eras, by an understanding of how the historical spaces within which 
individuals dwell uniquely create consciousness. Foucault’s lectures on 
biopolitcs provide a prime starting point for understanding how these 
spaces admit and instill the other, in terms of locating that which exists only 
in a relation to a social network and in contextual relations between and 
within power structures:  
[The] question here is the same as the question I addressed with 
regard to madness, disease, delinquency, and sexuality.  In all these 
cases, it was not a question of showing how these objects were for a 
long time hidden before finally being discovered, not of showing 
how all these objects are only wicked illusions or ideological 
products to be dispelled in the [light] of reason finally having 
reached its zenith. It was matter of showing by what conjunctions a 
whole set of practices- from the moment they become coordinated 
with a regime of truth – was able to make what does not exist 
(madness, disease, delinquency, sexuality, etcetera), nonetheless 
become something, something however, that continues not to exist. 
That is to say, what I would like to show is…how a particular 
regime of truth, and therefore not an error, makes something that 
does not exist able to become something. It is not an illusion since it 
is precisely a set of practices, real practices, which establishes it and 
thus imperiously makes it out in reality…. what I am talking about 
now, is to show how the coupling of a set of practices and a regime 
of truth form an apparatus (dispositif) of knowledge-power that 
effectively marks out in reality that which does not exist and 
legitimately submits it to the division between true and false.22 
A key aspect of Foucault’s truth regime is that the concepts that emerge from 
the interrelation of various discourses are not spaces where ontic or platonic 
truth resides. Even in exclusion, there is no metaphysical essence beyond the 
relationship between the excluding power structure and the marginalized 
position; that “something” that is brought into being, but continues to not 
exist in a metaphysical sense. This speaks directly to the reality of one’s 
identity in a post-colonial context where the discernable figurehead of 
subjugation has ostensibly vanished (in terms of an empire), but remains in 
the machinery of the social. Without a definitive counterpoint, the resulting 
flux of the power dynamic creates this space that is at once determined by, 
and determines, these structures as they manifested in a subject’s actions 
and thoughts as they enter the social fabric of empirical policy and 
institutional movement. The space of identity is this dual movement of 
manifesting the other (the colonial other in terms of the excluded subject) 
through the individual’s existential subjectivity, and concurrently, the pre-
empting of the subject’s freedom of perception by their own history. This 
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dual movement can be explored and traced through an analysis of both the 
space of the self and the space of history, to arrive at a more precise 
understanding of identity and dwelling in the contemporary world.  As 
opposed to the historical struggle as outlined in Kindred, the Lateral Identity 
of the subject, one not held hostage by the past, but persisting in the 
aftermath of the struggle, emerges in Paul Beatty’s novel The Sellout.23 Here, 
the historical notion of Foucault’s power regime is illuminating, as the 
narrator attempts to define what he is as an African-American male, outside 
of the Other and outside of the promises and dreams of history (not history 
itself per se, as one can never “escape” history). Yet he dwells within the 
structures of the Other, in law, society, and identity politics. 
 
The Sellout: “So what exactly is our thing?” 
Paul Beatty’s novel The Sellout follows an African-American narrator who is 
removed from Kindred’s violent battle between present and past. The novel 
recounts its narrator’s rethinking—and seemingly discarding—notions of 
metaphysical essence surrounding historical identity, through his efforts to 
reinstate segregation and slavery in his hometown. At the start of the novel 
the narrator stands before the Supreme Court of the United States regarding 
case number 09-2606, Me v. the United States of America. The case is highly 
controversial as it accuses the narrator (named Me) of reinstating slavery. 
The narrator makes his case directly to readers, as if he were addressing the 
Justices, starting with the novel’s opening sentence: “[t]his may be hard to 
believe, coming from a black man, but I’ve never stolen anything.”24  Such a 
statement assumes that the reader is white. Yet, the narrator quickly 
reconfigures his outsider status in relation to all races, far from the Other’s 
ability to solidify identity and place: the ethos of an identity. 
The search for the ethos of his identity, a uniting a priori definition of 
race, was a priority since Me’s childhood, as he explains: “[g]rowing up, I 
used to think all of black America’s problems could be solved if we only had 
a motto.”25 The redemption in unity, in uniformity, as a result not of 
exclusion but of ontology, is the default concept of social and cultural 
advancement, one that transcends economies, histories, and cultures, that 
serves as a benchmark for measuring progress. The narrator invests in this 
belief, stating that “[e]very race has a motto,”26 but he quickly grows 
frustrated in his attempts to find a motto that can encompass everything, 
one that fits neatly into an either/or definition. Yet at the opening of the 
book, Me stands before the law, where one has to be either/or, one or the 
other: “[d]umfounded, I stood before the court, trying to figure out if there 
was a state of being between ‘guilty’ and ‘innocent’. Why are those my only 
alternatives? I thought. Why couldn’t I be ‘neither’ or ‘both’?”27 Indeed, 
standing accused of reinstituting slavery, he struggles “to be on trial for my 
life, and for the first time ever not feel guilty…. I understand now that the 
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only time black people don’t feel guilty is when we’ve actually done 
something wrong, because that relieves us of the cognitive dissonance of 
being black and innocent….”28 As Me faces the Justices (one of whom is 
African-American), and the censure of the African-Americans in attendance, 
he tries to cultivate his historical identity, as someone who should regret his 
crime: “[u]ncomfortable with being so comfortable, I make one last attempt 
to be at one with my people.”29  He tries to focus on the civil rights 
movement, the violence it imposed, Selma, and other major historical 
milestones in African-American history, but can only envision the 
participants in these events as zombies, with “the head zombie” looking 
“exhausted from being raised from the dead every time someone wants to 
make a point about what black people should and shouldn’t do, can and 
cannot have.”30 Here the disconnect between the narrator and history 
embodies the lateral notion of the space of the subject, one who is not 
unaware of history, but feels fundamentally unattached from it, from a 
history that lacks ethos—a zombie-like apparition where the arbitrariness of 
the Other stands front and center. The struggle here is antipodal to the one 
in Kindred: It is a fight for meaning, rather than a flight from (tyrannical) 
meaning. 
Me continues his case with an explanation of his childhood, and how 
he learned to be black. He recounts how he was raised by a father (the sole 
practitioner of “liberation psychology”) who utilized techniques to socialize 
and imprint a Pavlovian sense of black identity on him. His father would 
put “toy police cars, cold cans of Pabst Blue Ribbon, Richard Nixon 
campaign buttons, and a copy of The Economist in my bassinet […] I learned 
to be afraid of the presented stimuli because they were accompanied by him 
taking out the family .38 Special and firing several window-rattling rounds 
into the ceiling, while shouting “N***er, go back to Africa!”31 Through similar 
techniques, the narrator’s father inscribes “blackness” into his psyche.32 
Symbols of identity (blackness) are imprinted solely in a historically lateral 
sense, as lynch-pins of identity, devoid of the historical culmination of social 
relationships. What results is not a socialized individual, but rather a 
detachment and exclusionary basis of identity that the subject cannot grasp. 
As the (unofficial) neighborhood psychologist, his father’s central question 
was “Who am I? and how may I become myself?”33 This question reappears 
throughout the novel as the narrator’s own defining struggle, as he tries to 
answer this question: “[s]o introspective questions like ‘Who am I? And how 
can I be that person?’ didn’t pertain to me then, because I already knew the 
answer. Like the entire town of Dickens, I was my father’s child, a product 
of my environment, and nothing more. [….] Problem is, they both 
disappeared from my life […] and suddenly, I had no idea who I was, and 
no clue how to become myself.”34  Here is the radical separation of being and 
self, as it exists outside of its foundational environment. Even with the main 
signifiers of the Other erased (despite the subject’s relationship with them) 
the subject itself does not disappear, but remains restricted in limbo, without 
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a central referent to ground it. As opposed to Kindred, the subject is not 
disfigured, not rendered incomplete, but rather suspended in mid-air with 
the loss of the Other. But yet, the converse also makes itself apparent, 
namely that the entirety of a subject’s being cannot be completely 
encapsulated within its historical environment; although the environment 
structures the self’s perceptual grid, the subject’s context is inseparable from 
the self but does not exhaust it. And the inability to answer the question 
“Who am I?” in the absence of central referents is the subject’s exposure to 
this marginal “space.” However, the subject cannot dwell in this space, as it 
relies by definition upon manifesting an Other, even its inverse. However, 
this marginal space resists the postmodern onslaught of the proliferation of 
labels to define and give voice to it. It is this contradiction that leaves the 
narrator unfulfilled with by the search for a motto, but then cannot answer 
the question “Who am I?” (again, an example of the failure of an either/or 
categorization required before the law). 
After the death of his father and the disappearance of the city of 
Dickens, the narrator goes to extreme measures to put his city back on the 
map. This mission ultimately leads to Dickens resident Hominy Jenkins, the 
last Little Rascal alive and the only African-American among the Rascals. 
The elderly Hominy was the product of a stereotypical and racist media 
industry as a Little Rascal, often portrayed in demeaning and humiliating 
racist situations. However, Hominy embraced that identity with such 
enthusiasm, both as a child and as a resident of Dickens, that he was 
generally regarded as “a mark of shame on the African-American legacy, 
something to be eradicated, stricken from the racial record, like the 
hambone, Amos ‘n’ Andy, Dave Chappelle’s meltdown, and people who say 
“Valentime’s Day.”35 In fact, Hominy took the city’s disappearance so hard 
he tried to commit suicide, because he felt so irrelevant and fans no longer 
visited. When narrator Me saved his life by foiling a suicide attempt, 
Hominy pledges himself as a slave to the narrator. Hominy tells the 
narrator, “sometimes we just have to accept who we are and act accordingly. 
I’m a slave. That’s who I am. It’s the role I was born to play. A slave who just 
also happens to be an actor.”36 Me is, in a sense, stuck with Hominy, after 
trying repeatedly to rid himself of Hominy’s ‘service’: “I tried to “free” 
Hominy countless times. Simply telling him he was free had no effect,”37 as 
Hominy would simply use his freedom to choose slavery. Here Hominy, 
unable to resist the Other, or exist outside if it, must, by any means, have an 
answer to the question “Who am I?” 
With Hominy under his proprietorship, the narrator goes about 
reestablishing his city. In the most forthright way, he starts to draw a line of 
white spray-paint around the city’s former border. The narrator also is 
assisted by the other residents: “[s]ometimes, after retiring for the day, I’d 
return the next morning, only to find that someone else had taken up where 
I’d left off. Extended my line with a line of their own, often in a different 
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color. Sometimes the line wouldn’t be a line at all but drops of blood, or an 
uninterrupted string graffiti signing off on my efforts….”38 The arbitrary 
nature of the line was not lost on any of the residents, including the narrator, 
but once the line was drawn, the residents immediately “saw” the city 
manifest and with “[p]uzzled looks on their faces from asking themselves 
why they felt so strongly about Dickens side of the line as opposed to the 
other side…. When it was just a line.”39 
 With Hominy as his slave, and the city lines literally redrawn, Me 
decides to segregate Dickens as a way to save it from disappearing into 
irrelevance. Central to this endeavor is that the city is primarily occupied by 
racial and ethnic minorities, primarily African-Americans and Chicanos. De 
facto segregation already existed in Dickens, economically and racially, but 
much like the line the narrator draws around the city, by posting a “white’s 
only” sign on the bus, segregation becomes manifest and emerges from a 
web of Foucauldean relationships not as an ontic reveal, but as a manifest 
reality relying on legal and perceptive power structures. The city’s racial 
demographics presented an obstacle to Me’s mission of imposing 
segregation in all facets of daily life in Dickens, when he had to ask himself 
“[h]ow do you racially segregate an already racially segregated school?”40 
The ultimate irony in Me’s posting of the “white’s only” sign is that it 
became central to the new Dickens’s experience: “[It’s] the signs. People 
grouse at first, but the racism takes them back. Makes them humble. Makes 
them realize how far we’ve come, and, more important, how far we have to 
go. On that bus it’s like the specter of segregation has brought Dickens 
together.”41 Similar to the city lines marked with white spray paint, the 
realities of pre- and post-segregation Dickens (as defined by the “white’s 
only” sign) are by objective standards the same (if defined by poverty, 
demographic segregation, and disenfranchisement). However, outlining 
segregation as a thing of the past defines both the loss of progress, by 
realizing that nothing has empirically changed, and the feeling that so much 
progress has occurred. This again is a sentiment that does not fit into an 
either/or categorization, as the narrator alludes in his opening statement 
regarding the not guilty/guilty verdict.  
The notion of race, primarily whiteness, is of prime significance in a 
community essentially already segregated along demographic lines. The 
narrator expands the notion of whiteness beyond mere biology: “[Even] the 
ones who are biologically white aren’t white white. Laguna Beach volleyball 
white. Bel Air white…. Three first names white. Valet parking white. Brag 
about your Native American, Argentinian, Portuguese ancestry white….”42 
Here again we see the lateral definition of the Other in Foucault’s notion of 
history. The narrator expands the definition of blackness’s own historical 
and biological determinations: “everyone in Dickens, regardless of race, was 
black and you determined someone’s degree of blackness not by skin color 
or hair texture but by whether they said ‘For all intents and purposes’ or ‘For 
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all intensive purposes’.”43  This statement displaces ‘black’ and ‘white’ as 
racial categorizations, instead relying on structural positions of the 
marginalized and the privileged. It is the ambiguous dual movement of 
freeing the signifier ‘blackness’ from a necessary signified of deprivation 
and disenfranchisement, at the same time ignoring empirical socio-economic 
realities and the inherited history of African-American social and economic 
marginalization in the U.S (another history that resists either/or 
categorization). This is the price the narrator pays for confronting the Other, 
by refusing to manifest its power regime. Unlike Dana’s experience in 
Kindred, this movement does not result in a loss of unity or disfigurement, 
but rather a loss of self, of ground—in short, homelessness. 
The quest for segregation concludes toward the end of the novel, as 
the narrator is arrested for owning a slave. Shortly before Me’s arrest, 
Hominy quits slavery, remarking to the narrator that “we’ll talk reparations 
in the morning.”44 After his arrest Me again stands before the law as the 
judge states:  
[The] irony is not lost on me that we sit here in the courtroom—a 
female state’s attorney general of black and Asian lineage, a black 
defendant, a black defense counselor, a Latina bailiff, and me, a 
Vietnamese-American district judge—setting the parameters for 
what is essentially a judicial argument about the applicability, the 
efficacy, and the very existence of white supremacy as expressed 
through our system of law. And while no one in this room would 
deny the basic premise of ‘civil rights’, we’d argue forever and a 
day about what constitutes ‘equal treatment under the law’.45 
Here is where the disappearance of the authoritarian figurehead casts the 
structure it is meant to anchor into disarray. In a diverse, multicultural court 
of Law, where does the power of the Other reside? In a free society, where 
does segregation reside when all the data clearly marks the presence of 
segregation? 
Me confronts this question as he listens to his father’s comprehensive 
theory on “Quintessential Blackness.” It is a theory based on linear 
development rather than a metaphysical clearing of black identity. This 
theory develops through three stages, from a precociousness state toward a 
“race transcendentalism” culminating in a “collective consciousness that 
fights oppression and seeks serenity.”46 This third stage includes such 
historical figures as Rosa Parks, Harriet Tubman, Sitting Bull, Cesar Chavez, 
Ichiro Suzuki, and people “who believe in beauty for beauty’s sake.”47 The 
final stage also conflates race and structural resistance to oppression into a 
universal consciousness forged in resistance no longer based on race. In 
evaluating his father’s theory, Me posits his own additional stage:  
There should be a Stage IV of black identity – Unmitigated 
Blackness. I am not sure what Unmitigated Blackness is, but 
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whatever it is, it doesn’t sell…. Unmitigated Blackness is simply not 
giving a fuck…. It’s the realization that there are no absolutes, 
expect when there are. It’s the acceptance of contradiction not being 
a sin and a crime but a human frailty like split ends and 
libertarianism. Unmitigated Blackness is coming to the realization 
that as fucked up and meaningless as it all is, sometimes it’s the 
nihilism that makes life worth living.48  
This passage recognizes the contradictory nature of postcolonial identity 
(“that there are no absolutes except when there are”): that there is no 
either/or once the Other is exposed, but instead an ability to detach from 
identity in the hope that one is free to respond (or not) as an individual, and 
not as a category. Me does not see the culmination of black identity as his 
father did, as a transcendentalism based on a reactionary struggle, a self 
defined in opposition. For the narrator, his final stage would be one of “not 
giving a fuck.” The self breathes life into the historical structures of identity, 
so it is both historically determined and irrefutably existential. Here is the 
sin that is “not a crime” as described in the narrator’s final stage of 
identity—abandoning the historical identity of Stage III ‘blackness’, as his 
father posited, and resurrecting the subject’s reign over the Other. This 
movement does not forsake the history behind such an identity, but suggests 
the prioritizing of the individual over the confines of historical identity, 
while also recognizing the real and very empirical nature of concepts and 
how they manifest and shape the Other (thus “there are no absolutes, expect 
when there are”). The narrator captures this idea in his understanding of 
history: “[t]hat’s the problem with history, we like to think it’s a book—that 
we can turn the page and move the f**k on. But history isn’t the paper it’s 
printed on. It’s memory, and memory is time, emotions, and song. History is 
the things that stay with you.”49  History is that which remains, its memory 
stemming from the subject, not from the external locus of what one was (or 
is) through the Other.  
The novel’s conclusion portrays the narrator at the local donut shop 
where his father used to lead meetings with community intellectuals. During 
an open mike night at the shop a white couple is in attendance. The African-
American comic  stops in the mid-routine and kicks out the whites, not 
because they are unwelcome but because this is “our thing,” an event only 
for Dickens’s African-American community. After the incident Me agrees 
with the comic’s action, but wonders “[s]o what exactly is our thing?”50 He is 
no closer to answering the question “Who am I?” 
Rather than succumb to a fatalistic nihilism, the narrator abandons his 
search for a motto, and instead formulates his Stage IV of black identity—
Unmitigated Blackness as the reprioritization of the individual. The 
individual (the other) who, while historically determined, claims the 
freedom—the “nihilism” of Stage 4—that opens an emancipating 
space.beyond the infinite dialogue with the Other (as exemplified by the 
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judges’ comments at the close of the trial). Here the name of the case, Me v. 
The United States, makes clear that Me’s fight comes from the locus of an 
individual, not a clearing/space for the Other. This individuality allows one 
to exist outside oneself (as a historical subject) in a manner of speaking, or, 
put another way, to be a sellout. 
 The contractionary nature of identity, in the locus of a subject that 
shapes the world and is shaped by it, clears a space for accountability in the 
culturally relativist landscape of a globalized world. Far from a moral 
directive, the recognition that to act outside oneself, even in annihilation of 
the subject, can be a radical refusal to manifest the Other, is a fundamental 
aspect of modern dwelling. This does not preclude the ability to actively 
represent oneself within a political space. The Other is not a passive idea 
awaiting to become; it is active, it forces itself through the subject both 
intellectually, by framing perception, and through the social mechanisms of 
law and political economy (which at their core are the Other working 
through subjects). It is thus an Other, a historical tyranny of identity and 
systemic power, pitted against an other who resists as an active “space” that 
constitutes the heart of modern dwelling. This struggle against the Other, in 
a lateral sense in The Sellout, and historically in Kindred, is not fighting for 
one’s home, or expelling the other from it, but of willfully reappropriating 
the terms that the Other has imposed in the very act of building, and thus of 
dwelling itself. 
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